However, the most dramatic manifestation of Cuba's internationalism is little known in the West: the island's crucial role in securing the independence of Namibia and ending racist rule in South Africa. In the 1970s and especially the 198 Os, a mass international movement developed against racist rule in South Africa. As this period recedes in the popular consciousness, unresolved issues remain with regard to the forces and events that led to the demise of apartheid. A major lacuna in the literature is an adequate account of the impact of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in southeastern Angola the decisive defeat of the South African armed forces by combined Cuban, Angolan, and Namibian troops in the largest battle in Africa since World War II. This dramatic confrontation occurred at a critical moment in the struggle, both internationally and within South Africa, against apartheid, and Cuba's contribution was vital in providing the essential reinforcements, material, and planning.
Whereas the central aim of this article is to tell the untold story of Cuba's decisive contribution to ending apartheid, an overview of the broader context of the island's internationalism and, in particular, its support of African national liberation movements is necessary. The Cuban medical and educational projects being conducted throughout Africa and the South today are a clear manifestation of the internationalist spirit that pervades its revolutionary project. Just as the Cuban Revolution can be viewed as the product of Cuba's long struggle for national liberation, independence, and social justice, so internationalism can be seen as embedded in the historical development of the Cuban nation. In many ways, Cuba has successfully challenged the strictures that have confined countries of the South to being mere obj ects and instruments of history rather than subjects and active agents in shaping their own destinies. As an organic component ofrevolutionary policy, Cuba's role in Africa must be placed in the context of the history, politics, and sociology of the island and the Cuban Revolution, in particular. Two of the central issues in any discussion of that role are how and why a small Third World island nation was able to be such a significant actor.
The main focus is on Cuba's role in defending Angola from apartheid South Africa's aggression, particularly the battle of Cuito Cuanavale. Of course, this requires engaging the questions Why did Cuba send combat troops to Angola? Was it surrogate activity for the Soviet Union or independent action aimed at defending a newly independent country from racist attack? In dealing with Cuito Cuanavale the central issues are what happened, what was at stake, where it fits within the tradition of Cuban internationalism, and what its legacy is. While the battle occurred in Angola, itwas also fought and continues to be fought within the social structures, processes, and national narrative of South Africa. The competing narratives that have been constructed around the battle and Cuba's involvement are, of course, reflective of the very distinct class and international forces that were aligned on one side or the other during the conflict. At the time, the South African Defense Force (SADF) went to great lengths to deny what actually happened at Cuito Cuanavale. In the face ofthis debacle, Pretoria attempted to conceal its defeat and the extent of South African casualties. As Susan Hurlich (personal communication, January 11, 2005) , a participant in the southern African liberation struggle, points out, "The South Africans didn't want to admit how many had actually died, because of the demoralization this would cause at home. They claimed a South African victory rather than a defeat." The remnants of the racist regime, especially those who retain considerable influence and power in the postapartheid armed forces now reconstituted as the South African National Defense Force (S ANDFY4 "still try to conceal" the extent of the defeat. On the one hand, the battle is relegated to limbo by South African academic discourse. In a search of the index of the Military History Journal, a biannual publication of the South African National Museum of Military History and the South African Military History Society, revealed not a single article on it. On the other hand, there is a concerted effort to portray the battle as a victory for the SADF (see, e.g., Allport, n.d; Barber, 1989;  Heitman, n.d.; Notling, n.d.; Schmidt, 2005) in which thousands of Cubans and Angolans were killed but South Africa sustained few casualties EMarias, 2004) .
Outside S outh Africa, too, the battle continues to be marginalized in Western scholarship. Frequently, it is just ignored (see, e.g., Buntman, 2003: 20-21;  Callinicos, 1988; Heywood, 2000) , and when it is mentioned it is often treated as having had little impact on the subsequent course of events (Alden, 1996: 236-237;  Breytenbach, 1997: 62; George, 2005: 277;  James, 1992: 177; Marx, 1992: 226; Omer-Cooper, 1994: 290) . It has even been asserted that "South Africa never had any intention of deploying its troops to capture Cuito Cuanavale" (James, 1992: 177) and was able to withdraw its armed forces without "too much loss of face" (Sparks, 1990: 313) . Alternatively, the South African defeat is transmuted into a victory for the racist regime (Crocker, 1992: 360-361;  Morris, 2000: 34) . The end result of both approaches is the denial of any role for Cuito Cuanavale in bringing about the dissolution of apartheid.
These two positions are directly contradicted by the reality that the direct outcome of the battle was what the apartheid regime had been fighting to forestall: the end of its campaign of regional destabilization, which was essential to not only establishing regional domination but diverting building domestic pressures, the end of its occupation of Namibia and the ascension to power of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the beginning of negotiations with the African National Congress (ANC), the release of Nelson Mandela, and the decriminalization of antiapartheid organizations, all of which eventually led to the dismantling of apartheid.
A number of former South African soldiers have confirmed the extent of the debacle (Bravo, 1990) . Mark Patrick, who served in the South African army, unequivocally states that Pretoria was "forced to withdraw from Angola." Ross Mardon confirms that the SADF was "definitely by far outgunned, out-maneuvered, out-fought, out-tacticed, out-everything you want to say.) David Kimber underscores that the battle of Cuito Cuanavale "was a massive defeat" (Bravo, 1990) for the South African armed forces. Andre Zaaiman, a former captain, affirms that South Africa "lost the war at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale."
Prior to the emergence of African anticolonial and national liberation movements, South Africa's ruling circles were content to view southern Africa solely in economic terms, "as an exploitable resource, a source of cheap labour and a ready market for the country's products" (TRC, 1999: 13). However, to counter the liberation movements and protect the apartheid regime "politicians and senior security strategists began to conceptualise the region, and particularly the minority-ruled and colonial territories of Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa, primarily as a military buffer zone" (TRC, 1999: 13 Consequently, the defeat at Cuito Cuanavale stymied South Africa's drive for hegemony, altering the regional balance of forces. It was the turning point in the struggle against apartheid. While the battlefields in Angola and the townships of South Africa were geographically separate and distinct arenas of struggle against apartheid, they were intimately entwined. The defeat of the S ADF in Angola reverberated throughout South Africa, acting as both a sym-bol and a catalyst for the popular forces while materially reducing the military capacity for repression of the South African government.
There is a school of thought that has characterized S outh Africa's "revolution" (i.e., the transition from the apartheid regime) as peaceful (see, e.g., S ampson, 2001: ix, xi (Grogg, 2004) .
The Cuban government has also set up the Latin American School of Medicine to train doctors from across the developing world. These students are given Cuban government scholarships and attend on the condition that once they have graduated they will return to offer their services to the neediest and poorest communities in their countries. At present, there are more than 6,000 students studying at the school EMartlnez Puentes, 2003: 405), and it is estimated that by 2005 it will have produced 1,400 physicians. This form of international assistance was instituted at the very beginning of the revolution, and since the 1960s more than 40,000 students from 120 countries have received education and training in Cuba (see, e.g., Richmond, 1991) . To facilitate this program, US$500 million in scholarships has been provided over this period for foreign students. Grace Usshona, the Namibian ambassador to Cuba, is an example ofthe impact of this educational program.
She was one of the children who survived the notorious Kassinga massacre perpetrated by the South African armed forces on May 4, 1978. In response to the massacre the Cuban government offered to educate all of the survivors.
Usshona explains (Grogg, 2004) , ' The Cuban government and various mass and professional organizations have convened international symposia to discuss, debate, and oppose the consequences of neoliberal globalization. This is a continuation ofthe Cuban struggle for a New International Economic Order that was carried out in the 1970s and 1980s (see, e.g., Castro, 1984 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005 . These conferences have brought together hundreds of activists with the goal of forging a common program of action to confront the neoliberal agenda. The most recent concrete manifestation of Cuba's efforts is its commitment to the Alternativo Bolivariana (Bolivarian Alternative ALBA). Conceived by Venezuela's President Hugo Chaivez, this is a direct challenge to the FTAA and aims to create an integrated Latin American economic unit that respects national sovereignty and promotes cooperation, development, and socialjustice. In short, ALBA constitutes a challenge to U.S.-imposed and -dominated arrangements in the region.
Outstanding among the examples of Cuba's internationalism have been its aid to various national liberation, anticolonial, and anti-imperialist movements. While immeasurably amplified under the Cuban Revolution, this internationalism has deep roots in the island's history (see Adams, 1981: 1 13; Erisman, 2000; 1985) . Jose Martf, Cuba's preeminent national hero and author of the 1895-1898 war against Spanish colonial rule, "was not simply fighting to overthrow the Spanish and win political independence for Cuba but was also fighting as an international revolutionary to secure the liberation of his continent, and indeed of the world" (Kirk, 1983: 15). In the 1930s 44more than 1 ,000 Cubans went to Spain as combatants at the time of the Civil War, to defend the Republic. In proportion to its population at the time, Cuba was the country that sent the most volunteers to Spain" (Risquet, 1989: 13).
The Cuban revolutionary government viewed the extension of such assistance as both a fulfilment of its internationalist responsibility and an imperative for the survival of the revolution. According to Castro (2003a: 49-50),
The United States actually declared war against us. It globalized the struggle against Cuba, in order to suffocate the revolution, took the war to Latin Amer-ica, Africa, Asia, everywhere. Therefore, we also globalized the revolutionary struggle against the United States. As to the revolutionary movements, for us it was not ondy our duty but also a necessity. When we felt we had abetter understanding of the world and we had our own experience of what the world was like the policies of exploitation and plundering, the situation in the Third World, particularly in Latin America and Africa then we felt it was our duty to support the revolutionary movements.
Diplomatic solidarity, training, military aid, and other forms of concrete material assistance were provided to, for example, the National Liberation Front of Algeria in its struggle for independence from France, the Congo, where Che Guevara led a guerrilla group, and Guinea-Bissau's liberation struggle against Portugal. In 1977 the Cuban armed forces were critical in turning back a Somalian invasion of Ethiopia. Extensive assistance was provided to Nicaragua during the struggle of the Sandinistas against the Anastasio Somoza dictatorship. Once the Sandinistas had triumphed, Cuba sent construction workers, doctors, teachers, and technicians to aid in the reconstruction and development of Nicaragua. Similar help was rendered to the Grenadian Revolution from 1979 to 1983. The island has also provided a safe haven for African-American, Puerto Rican, and other political exiles.
THE DEFENSE OF ANGOLA
Cuba's most dramatic and, arguably, most significant internationalist mission was its contribution to the defense of Angola's independence against South African aggression. From 1975 to 1991, more than 300,000 Cuban volunteers participated in repelling several South African invasions, as well as serving in a variety of civilian positions as, among others, doctors and educators. More than 2,000 Cubans lost their lives in the Angolan mission (Cant6n Navarro, 2000: 245) .
Cuban involvement in southern Africa has an almost paradoxical quality. On one hand, it has been repeatedly dismissed as surrogate activity for the Soviet Union, an instrument of Soviet-era expansionism. This reflects the thinking of the dominant school that understands the Angolan civil war solely in East-West terms. Here Cuba's role is considered simply a function of Moscow's contestation with Washington over influence in and control over Africa (see, e.g., Klinghoffer, 1980: 2-3). On the other, the crucial role of Cuba in securing Namibia's independence and expediting the demise of apartheid, a compelling story of disinterested military intervention, has been ignored and erased from collective memory. It is imperative to underscore that despite its condemnation by Washington for its "mercenary steps carried out at Soviet request in order to 'take advantage' of African conflicts and bring resource-rich Africa under Soviet domination" (Adams, 1981: 108), in all of Cuba's military missions abroad it acquired no economic interests.
Amilcar Cabral, the celebrated leader of the liberation struggle in Guinea-B issau and Cape Verde, emphasized that "Cuba made no demands; it gave us unconditional aid" (Gleijeses, 2001: 198) . Cuba is often described as the only foreign country to have come to Africa and gone away with nothing but the coffins of its sons and daughters. As Thenjiwe Mtintso, South Africa's ambassador to Cuba, has put it: "No country has given as much to the world as Cuba. No country has received so little materially from the world as Cuba" (2004) .
In the case of Angola, Castro (1975) In an address to Cuban personnel embarking for Angola, Castro (1977) underscored these sentiments: In 1978, the Nigerian ambassador to Cuba summed up his government's position: "I want to assure you that my country has absolute support for Cuba because we know that Cuba's activities in Africa are honest and just. Cuba has no investments in Africa and this is proof it is not there for any benefit. I ask the Cubans to continue their good work" (Adams, 1981: 116).
Piero Gliejeses has provided what is now accepted as the definitive account of the reasons Cuba became involved in Angola. On the basis of a comprehensive study ofthe archival material in the United States, Cuba, Britain, Belgium, and Portugal and interviews with more than 150 individuals, including CIA officers with knowledge of the conflict, he concludes that the Cuban government decided to dispatch combat troops to Angola to repel a South African invasion and that the Soviet Union had no role in Cuba's decision and was not even informed of it prior to deployment (2001: 307, 379 (Adams, 1981: 119 (Saul, 1993: 19; TRC, 1999: 45) . Gleijeses (2001: 276-299, 399) establishes through painstaking documentation that Washington had organized an extensive destabilization campaign against the prospect of an independent Angola.
In August 1975 South African forces invaded Angola and followed this with a much larger invasion in October, whose objective was the installation of UNITA inpower (Danaher, 1984: 117; North, 1986 : 21 1; Pazzanita, 1991: 85; Seidman, 1990: 51-52; TRC, 1999: 45) . Pretoria saw the assumption of power by the MPLA "as atreatto South Africa's security" (TRC, 1999: 45) .
Kissinger and the CIA encouraged and supported the invasion. The CIA funneled arms and money to UNITA and the FNLA. which together with Zairean troops attacked from the north with the aim of seizing Cabinda, a very important oil-producing area. The CIA was not "a rogue elephant in this affair. The program was approved at the highest levels of the executive branch. Kissinger approved the CIA program, and had encouraged the Israelis and the South Africans to intervene militarily against the MPLA" (Danaher, 1985: 115; see also Stockwell, 1978 Castro explained: "When South African regular troops invaded Angola, we couldn't stand by and do nothing. When the MPLA asked for our help we offered them the help they needed" (Bravo, 2001) . Elsewhere he emphasized, "We simply could not sit back when the MPLA asked us for help. We gave MPLA the necessary assistance to prevent a people fighting for their independence for almost 14 years from being crushed. It was our elementary duty, our revolutionary duty, our internationalist duty to give assistance to MPLA regardless of the price" (quoted in Wolfers and Bergerol, 19 83: 3 1).
In an October 8, 1975, speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Ricardo Alarcon, then Cuba's ambassador to the UN and now president of the National Assembly, outlined the philosophical and political framework that guided Cuba's assistance to Angola and eventual deployment of combat troops to counter South Africa (quoted in Stockwell, 1978: 171):
In Angola the conspiracy of imperialism, its allies and lackeys, has found concrete expression in the brazen interference designed to frustrate true decolonization while threatening its territorial integrity; snatching away from the people's liberation movement of Angola the fruits of its dauntless struggle against colonialism, while condemning the future state to control by transnational corporations. Cuba renews the expression of its full solidarity with the people's liberation movement in Angola yesterday heroic in struggle against the European colonizer; today firm in its defense of true independence. In the face of scandalous interference of imperialists, colonialists and racists [in Angola], it is the elementary duty [of Cuba] to offer its [the Angolan] people the effective assistance that may be required for that country to ensure its true independence and full sovereignty. In order to spur the decolonization process, a coherent strategy must be implemented with the participation of all the progressive forces. This strategy is essential in order to face up to colonialist and racist machinations against the peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe [Rhodesia] and must oppose colonialism in all its forms andmanifestations in every comer of the earth.
As one Cuban soldier explained (Bravo, 1990) , Angola had freeditself from colonialism andwas attacked by South Africa, so Angola asked Cuba to help against South Africa. We'll help any poor country in need. It's true that many comrades fell, some from my own unit, people who'd been with me in the away. It's sad, but we all have to die one day. And to die for the freedom and independence of a country is to die for a just cause.
The Cuban government viewed its military assistance as not only aiding an independent country in its defense against a foreign invader but as the repayment of a historical debt owed to Africa as a result of slavery and the slave trade. Operation Carlota drew its name from an enslaved African Cuban woman who led a revolt against slavery on November 5, 1843. In delineating the significance of Cuba's assistance to African liberation struggles, Amflcar Cabral said, "I don't believe in life after death, but if there is, we can be sure that the souls of our forefathers who were taken away to America to be slaves are rej oicing today to see their children reunited and working together to help us be independent and free" (Gleijeses, 2001: 198) . With regard to Cuba's role in Angola, Castro (19 81: 55) observed, "For the first time in history, one of the peoples of our hemisphere, descendants of slaves who were cruelly uprooted from Africa by the voracity of the colonialist rule, sent thousands of its best sons to help peoples that were fighting for liberty and dignity in Africa." On another occasion he added, 'Those who once enslaved man and sent him to America perhaps never imagined that one of those peoples who received slaves would one day send their fighters to struggle for freedom in Africa" (1989: 69 (Bravo, 1990) . Finally, Jorge Risquet (1989: 13) stated unequivocally:
There were no doubts. It was not, however, a decision made without reflection. It was analyzed in depth. The conclusion was reached that it was correct to provide such aid, that it was absolutely necessary, and that it was possible. Not to do so, on the other hand, would be to commit a great crime against a people who had fought for a long time, a people we had helpedin that fight. Moreover, we saw this kind of aid as a duty, as something for which we didn't even expect thanks. Why? Because of the way Africans hadbeen brought to Cuba over the centuries. They came in chains. They were hunted down like animals, converted into human slaves, and thrown into the holds of ships. What is our debt to Africa? I think all countries to which slaves were taken, and which produced enonnous riches, owe an immense debt to Africa.
It must be emphasized that all military service in Angola was on a voluntary basis. Carlos Fundora (1991: 74-76), who served in Angola from 1985 to 1987, stresses this:
Up to the last minu te, you had the right to say you weren't going. There was one compaiiero who afterwards said he wasn't going. That happens. In a thousand, you might get thirty, twenty, ten, fifteen. In my case, in the group I was going, there was about 1 200 of us, and there were three compaiieros who saidno. And they didn't go. And on the way, I mean, when we were in the vehicle taking us to where we were going to train, they said to us, "Think about it well and if you have any difficulty, a family problem, tell us." One compaiero who had a family problem spoke up and there was no problem.
The Cuban effort attained such a scale that 'there were so many ships anchored in the Bay of Luanda, that President Agostinho Neto, counting them from his window, felt a very characteristic shudder of modesty. 'It's not right,' he said to a functionary personally close to him. 'If they go like that, the Cubans will ruin themselves "' (Garcfa Mairquez, 1989: 
41).
The island's international stature was dramatically elevated, leading to many declarations of support and praise for the vanguard role Cuba was performing in the service of national liberation struggles (see, e.g., Gleijeses, 2001: 380) . Moreover, the defeat of the South African forces was a major development in the African anticolonial struggle and "gave hope to South Africa's blacks" (393). As one analyst opined at the time, "In Angola Black troops Cuban and Angolans have defeated White troops in military exchanges and that psychological edge, that advantage the White man has enjoyed and exploited over 300 years of colonialism and empire, is slipping away" (8-9). The significance of the victory was underscored by The World, the foremostblack South Africannewspaper atthe time: "Black Africa is riding the crest of a wave generated by the Cuban success in Angola. Black Africa is tasting the heady wine of the possibility of realizing the dream of 'total liberation' " (quoted in Gleijeses, 2001: 9).
The defeat of South Africa was also a defeat for U.S. imperialism. This defeat of the "South African apartheid troops, allied to the U.S.," occurred 44amid cries of indignation and the torment of the U.S. leaders" (Gleijeses, 2004: 48). As Gleijeses emphasizes, Cuba's victory was a victory for those who had been victims of 'the overpowering might of Washington" (2001: 48). In short, the island refused to succumb to the limits that imperialism had imposed on the so-called Third World countries. Cuba would not only pursue its own path domestically but also aid others in their struggle to chart their own trajectories. The U.S. government embarked on a massive disinformation campaign aimed at denying that (1) South Africa had invaded Angola, (2) Cuban troops were in Angola at the request of the Angolan government in order to repel the invaders, and (3) Washington was complicit in the South African aggression. Intestimony before the U.S. Congress's House Subcommittee on Africa on May 25, 1978, the CIA's John Stockwell (quoted in Danaher, 1985: 131-132 ; see also Stockwell, 1978) One example of the disinformation campaign was the stories generated by the Lusaka CIA station (Stockwell, 1978: 175 After the South Africans were driven out, Cuban forces stayed for more than 14 years at the request of the Angolan government because of repeated South African invasions and continued aggression (Brittain, 1988a: 68; Danaher, 1984: 157, 183-185; Davidson, 1991: 343-351; Erisman, 1985: 71; Seidman, 1990: 50; TRC, 1999: 46) . During this period, Cuba provided extensive development assistance, sending physicians, teachers, technicians, and construction workers, and hundreds of Angolans received technical and professional training in Cuba (see, e.g., Henderson, 1979: 260 The other independent African countries supported the presence of Cuban troops in Angola both as a prerogative of Angola as an independent state and as necessary for protection against South African aggression (Harris, 1987: 247; see also Pazzanita, 1991: 91; Vale, Swartuk, and Oden, 2001 : 100). Pretoria unleashed "a war of regional destabilization against its neighbours" in order 'to ensure its survival as the white regionalhegemon" (Lee, 2001: 786) .
From 1980 to 1986, the South African destabilization campaign cost the victim states an estimated US$30 billion (Brittain, 1988b: 118) . Numerous bombing raids, armed incursions, and assassinations were carried out by South Africa against surrounding countries (see, e.g., TRC, 1999: 85-164 Franklin, 1997: 135; Danaher, 1984: 133; International Defence and Aid Fund, 1981; TRC, 1999: 46-55) .
In testimony before the TRC, Lieutenant Johan Frederich Verster, a member of the SADF's special forces, characterized this attack as "probably the most bloody exercise that we ever launched. We were parachuted into the target. It was a terrible thing. I saw many things that happened there but I don't want to talk about it now because I always start crying about it. It's damaged my life" (TRC, 1999: 44) . The TRC (1999: 43) (Bravo, 1990 ).
Washington's support for the UNITA and the war of destabilization continued because Angola was considered a threat to apartheid South Africa, a key U.S. strategic ally. This policy was most clearly articulated by Chester
Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the Reagan administration, who declared that racist South Africa "was an integral and important element of the global economic system" (Danaher, 1984: 157). South African incursions into and attacks on Angola were repeatedly condemned by various international bodies. For example, on January 6, 1984, the United Nations Security Council voted 13-0 (with the United States and the United Kingdom abstaining) to condemn a South African invasion of Angola (Danaher, 1984: 185). Coupled with this near universal international condemnation of South African aggression was express support for Cuba's role. While the Organization of African Unity condemned South Africa, it refused despite intense U.S. pressure to oppose the presence of Cuban troops. The British Commonwealth of Nations also expressed its support (Danaher, 1984: 118, 184) .
In response to the constant danger posed by the racist regime, Julius Nyerere, then Tanzanian president, "urged Havana to keep its troops in Angola to protect it from South Africa and to help SWAPO, the Namibian liberation movement" (Gleijeses, 2001: 380 (North, 1986 : 21 1; see also Danaher, 1984: 175) . Havana understood these African fears. In a 1985 response to a question from Washington Post correspondents on the conditions under which Cuban troops would be withdrawn, Castro (1985: 132, 134) outlined the Cuban government's commitment:
We know that all the independent countries of southern Africa are not happy with the withdrawal idea, because the Cuban forces are the only outside forces that have helped them against South Africa. They feel that when those forces leave they niight be at the mercy of South Africa, because South Africa has been very aggressive and they are very distrustful. We are the ones who benefit most from a settlement. I tell you frankly, we benefit most; we have been there for more than nine years, more than 200,000 Cubans have been to Angola. This is a real effort and we have no economic interest in Angola at all. But if a solution acceptable to Angola does not materialize, we will firmly continue with our support to that country as long as it is necessary.
AFRICAN STALINGRAD
In 1987, the For9as Armadas Popular para de Liberta9ao de Angola (the Angolan Armed Forces or FAPLA) launched an offensive against UNITA in the southeastern part of the country. The Cubans had advised against this operation because it would create the opportunity for a significant South African intervention (see Castro, 1995 Castro, , 1989 Leys and Saul, 1995: 36-37; Minter, 1994: 49; Rabkin, 1991: 30; Risquet 1989: 30; Treaster, 1988) . In response to the Angolan action and in an attempt to save UNITA, the South African government, with the support of the United States, launched its largest military invasion of Angola since 1975 (Brittain, 1998: 34; Pazzanita, 1991: 102-103). The centrality of UNITA to the apartheid regime had been highlighted by former South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan, who in 1979, when he was head of the SADF, said of UNITA's Jonas Savimbi, "His continued existence directly influences the future of Southern Africa. He has become so important that we will have to ensure his safety" (TRC, 1999: 56).
The South Africans stopped and repulsed the Angolan forces. The invasion, code-named Operations Modular and Hooper, involved more than 9,000 SADF troops, encompassing nine divisions with five regular white detachments. Included in this deployment were the elite 32nd "Buffalo," the 61st Mechanized, and the 9 1st and 101 st Special Forces battalions. Arrayed alongside were UNITA units and the S outh African Territorial Forces. One of the objectives was to inflict a devastating defeat on the FAPLA troops and capture Menogue, the capital of Cuando Cuabango Province, and thus establish a quasi-state in southern Angola that would be under the control of UNITA (see Ex-Combatants, 2004; Campbell, 1989) . This was to be the prelude to the subjugation of Angola and the installation of a Luanda government under South African tutelage. However, the drive to secure a "Pax Praetoria for Angola" was 'to go badly wrong" (Pazzanita, 1991: 102).
The South Africans were determined to capture the town and strategic military base of Cuito Cuanavale, which was important as a forward airbase forpatrolling and defending southern Angola (Brittain, 1998: 35) . Itwas here that 'the South Africans were tempted into an ill-fated effort to score a knock-out blow against the MPLA" (Heberstein and Evenson, 19 89: 171; see also Pazzanita, 1991: 102). Tothis end, Pretoria committed its besttroops and most sophisticated military hardware. In late 1987 the South Africans were 44convinced they were close to a decisive victory which would change the course of the war" (Brittain 1998: 35; see also Pazzanita, 1991: 103). A victory by the SADF would have cemented Pretoria's control over the southern African region.
As the situation for the Angolan troops became critical, the Cuban government was asked by Luanda to intervene. On November 15, 1987, Cuba decided to reinforce its forces in Angola by sending fresh detachments, arms, and equipment including tanks, artillery, antiaircraft weapons, and aircraft.
The first troop detachments began to arrive in Cuito Cuanavale in the first week of December 1987, thus bolstering its defense (Minter, 1994: 49; Wren, 1988) . Eventually, Cuban troop strength in Angola would rise to more than 50,000, with 40,000 deployed in the south, where the major engagements were occurring. Cuba was also able to achieve air supremacy, which proved a critical factor. It must be emphasized that for a small country such as Cuba the deployment of 50,000 troops was the equivalent of the United States's deploying 1.25 million soldiers.
The Cuban government considered it imperative to prevent the South Africans from capturing Cuito Cuanavale. A South African victory would have meant not only the capture of the town and the destruction of the best Angolan military formations but probably the end of Angola's existence as an independent country. Castro (2003b; has asserted that such was the precariousness of the situation that the deployment of troops took place despite the Cuban government's knowledge that South Africa possessed nuclear weapons and the apprehension that Pretoria might even be prepared to use them to stave off defeat. This concern was proved justified when, in a March 24, 1993, meeting of all three houses of the South African parliament President F. W. de Klerk disclosed that Pretoria had constructed six atomic bombs andwas working on a seventh in the 198Os (Hamlyn, 1993; Hounam and McQuillan, 1995: 43; Keller, 1993) . In order to avert a military calamity, the leading members of the Cuban government devoted the maj ority of their time to finding a solution to the crisis. Castro described the situation as follows: "Even the [Cuban] Revolution was at stake there, because if this was a decisive battle for apartheid and meant a large-scale defeat, the Revolution was also at stake and a different outcome would have meant a major defeat for the Revolution, regardless of how noble, how just and how altruistic the cause" (Editora Jose Mart1, 1989: 394) . During Nelson Mandela's 1991 visit to Cuba, Castro (1991: 34-35) once more emphasized that the revolution put everything at stake, it put its own existence at stake, it risked ahuge battle against one of the strongestpowers locatedin the area of the Third World, against one of the richest powers, with significant industrial and technological development, armed to the teeth, at such a great distance from our small country andwith our own resources, our own arms. We even ran the risk of weakening our defenses, and we did so. We used our ships and ours alone, and we used our equipment to change the relationship of forces, which made success possible in that battle. We put everything at stake in that action, and it was not the first time. I believe we also put an awful lot at stake in 1975 when we sent our troops to fight the South African invasion of Angola.
The battle that then ensued was the largest military engagement on the African continent since the North African battles during World War II (Campbell, 2001: 187; Collelo, 1991: 205; Pazzanita, 1991: 103;  Vanneman, 1990: 55). Three elite Angolan brigades the 21st the 25th, and the 59th faced decimation. The battle centered on the east side of the Cuito River. In early 19 8 8 South Africa launched five major offensives to seize the town: on January 1, February 14 and 25, and March 1 and 23. Each offensive was repulsed with high South African casualties (see, e.g., Pazzanita, 1991: 105; Ricketts, personal communication, December 23, 2004) .1 At one point, as the S outh African military situation deteriorated, P. W. Botha, the apartheid regime president, flew to the war zone in order to shore up and boost morale among the SADF field commanders (Campbell, 1989: 3, 12) , underscoring what was at stake.
At Cuito Cuanavale, the SADF was dealt a decisive defeat (Brittain, 1998: 36; Davidson, 1991: 348) as some of its troops were trapped (Harvey, 2001: 124). As a direct consequence, the military balance of power in the region was altered (Campbell, 2001: 187; Moorcraft, 1990: 208; Pazzanita, 1991: 113-114). As the South Africans withdrew, the Cubans, together with Angolan and SWAPO forces, advanced toward the Namibian border. This advance exposed the insecurity and vulnerability of the South African troops in northern Namibia (Minter, 1994: 49; Pazzanita, 1991: 107-108; Rabkin, 1991: 30) . By May 19 8 8 the Cuban forces were so close to the Namibian border that 44white South Africa's nightmare had become a reality" (Heberstein and Evenson, 1989: 173) . Such was this vulnerability that a senior South African officer said, "Had the Cubans attacked [Namibia] they would have over-run the place. We could not have stopped them" (quoted in Cliffe, 1994: 59) . Ronnie Kasrils, an ANC leader and military strategist (quoted in Brittain 1988b: 120), outlined the situation that faced the SADF:
Following the defeat at Cuito and the politically unacceptable loss of so many 19-year-old white conscripts, their acknowledged loss of superiority to the Cubans and Angolans in the air and the outelassing of many of the Amnscor weapons such as the G5 (long-range artillery), which used to be considered unanswerable, the South African generals are in deep trouble crisis really is the word.
This feeling of insecurity and vulnerability grew among the white South African population as the number of white casualties continued to rise (Sparks and Green, 1990: 47; see also Battersby, 1988; Brittain, 1988b: 120; Campbell, 2001: 187; Mwesiga and Landsberg, 2003: 262; Sparks, 1990: 313; Thompson, 1990: 239) . Increasing numbers of white youths began refusing service in the armed forces, swelling the ranks of the anticonscription campaign. For example, in August 1988, 143 men refused to participate in the war, leading tie regime to impose severe restrictions on the End Conscription campaign (SAIRR, 1989: 593). The former soldier, Mark Patrick stated, "One of the things that was starting to happen was that white people were starting to die up there and with that there became a lot of pressure for South African troops to withdraw. If they hadn't withdrawn I think there would have been a lot more lives lost" (Bravo, 1990) . Victoria Brittain (1988b: 122) The victory at Cuito Cuanavale became "a symbol across the continent that apartheid and its army were no longer invincible" (Brittain, 1998: 36) and was "regarded by many diplomats as a turning point" (Treaster, 1988) .
The defeat shattered the confidence of the South African military. This was further compounded by another South African debacle, when on June 27, 1988, at the southwestern Angolan town of Tchipa, a major South African offensive "a desperate attempt to break out" (Campbell, 2001 : 1 87) was resoundingly routed when the SADF was encircled (P. Ricketts, personal communication, December 22, 2004; Sparks, 1990: 313). This defeat was described by the South African newspaper the Weekly Mail as "a crushing humiliation. The condition of the SADF resembled the trenches of the Somme" (Campbell, 1989: 13; see also Campbell, 2001: 187) . As a consequence South Africa lost control of the economically strategic Calueque dam.
With the approach of Cuban forces toward Namibia, Pretoria sought a means by which to extricate its troops "without humiliation and alive" (Brittain, 1998: 37 ; see also Rabkin, 1991: 30) . The fear of a "Vietnam-like quagmire" (Harvey, 2001: 124) gripped the South African government. The defeat forced South African ruling circles to reconsider 'the wisdom of continuing a war on its border" (Vale, 2003: 71; see also Hornsby, 1988) . Reverend Beyer Naude of the South African Council of Churches echoed this assessment of the inability of the SADF to participate further in the conflict (Bravo, 1990) . The defeat had so severely weakened the South African armed forces that Michael Young, an adviser during the secret negotiations between Pretoria and the ANC, reports that in 1989 the SADF asserted that it 44could either continue the war and patrol South Africa's borders, or police the townships, but not both" (Harvey, 2001: 213) . As the former SADF captain Andre Zaaiman put it, 'The cost was too heavy" (Bravo, 1990) for the regime to continue the war. In short, South Africa could no longer sustain the 44losses in white lives and irreplaceable military equipment" (Alden, 1996: 236). The growing financial and material toll of the war is attested to by the increased military budgets. The 1986 The -1987 Rand, which was 30 percent more than in 1987-1988, consuming 14.7 percent of the overall budget as opposed to 13.7 percent respectively (SAIRR, 19 8 8: 512) . 89 the military expenditure rose to 8.2 billion Rand, a 22.4 percent increase over 1987-1988 and 15 percent of the entire South African budget. Moreover, in February 1989 the regime allocated another 560 million Rand to the SADF to address "the changes in the security situation in Namibia and Angola" (SAIRR, 1989: 519).
The battle of Cuito Cuanavale was instrumental in paving the way for meaningful negotiations (Brittain, 1998: 36-37; Campbell, 2001:187; Dominguez, 1992: 70; Hodges, 2001: 11-12; Jenkins, 1993: 332; Saul, 1993: 46; Sparks and Green, 1990: 32, 35; TRC, 1999: 59) . As one Cuban soldier succinctly summed up the situation, "South Africa was forced to negotiate. They realized things were getting hot" (Bravo, 1990) . Indeed, as Brittain (1988b: 123), underscored, "Cuba's military actions and readiness for sacrifice changed the balance of power as years of Western diplomacy could not"; the Cuban armed forces were 'the most important factor in the outcome of the negotiations." Cuito Cuanavale has been characterized by some as the African Stalingrad of apartheidbecause of its decisive impact on the course of regional developments (see, e.g., Risquet 1989: 32; Vanneman, 1990: 56) .2 The South African defeat forced the apartheid regime 'to make concessions that had been unimaginable only the year before" (Pazzanita, 1991: 103). In December 19 8 8 an agreement was reached between Cuba and Angola on one side and South Africa on the other, providing for the gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the establishment of an independent Namibia.
Cuba's role in Angola had been "undeniably pivotal in ending South Africa's control of Namibia" (Erisman, 2000: 235; see also Campbell, 2001: 187-188; Davidson, 1991: 348; Harvey, 2001: 144) . South Africa had occupied Namibia, a former German colony, since 1916. In 1920, the occupation was formalized under a mandate granted by the League of Nations. In 1966 the UN had revoked South Africa's mandate, and the UN General Assembly also passed several resolutions declaring South Africa's occupation illegal. In 1978, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 435 on Namibian independence, recognizing SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people. David Kimber, who served with the SADF in Namibia, observed: "It was clear from my experiences that the SADF was seen as a foreign force, as a colonization force" (Bravo, 1990) . Without its defeat at Cuito Cuanavale S outh Africa would have continued its occupation, violating and defying the UN resolutions and international law (Heberstein and Evenson, 1989: 175): S ou th Africa had no seri ou s intention ofleaving Naimibia. The govemnment had never really accepted Resolution 435 andwas determined to put off the evil day when the "suidwes" [South African settlers and business interests] would "go back." But once the SADFhadinvestedits prestige in capturing the airfieldofa remote Angolan town, and failed, the chemistry of the sub-continent changed.
Like it or not, the non-victor had to abide by the rules of the game.
Before Namibia had won its independence, Sam Nujoma (1989: xiii), leader of SWAPO, had praised Cuba:
We in the liberation movement in Africa are indeed grateful to the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba, and in particular companero Fidel Castro, for concrete material assistance, political and diplomatic support. We wish to pay special tribute to the Cuban Armed Forces, who travelled thousands and thousands of kilometers to come to Africa to assist in a practical way those of us who are still languishing in the chains of colonialism, imperialism and foreign domination in this region of southem Africa.
In his 1998 visit to Namibia, President Castro was greeted by Nujoma, who was now president, with "Welcome to the Republic of Namibia, the country which you helped to liberate" (Bravo, 2001) . The newspaper The Namibian affirmed that without Cuba's long-running military commitment the negotiations that directly led to Namibia's independence "would have been unthinkable" (Leys and Saul, 1995: 36 (2005), vicechair of the National Council of the Namibian parliament delivered a message to the Cuban government and people on behalf of Namibia's government declaring that the "blood of the Cuban soldiers waters our freedom."
The late Oliver Tambo (1988) , the long-serving president of the ANC during the apartheid era, observed that the defence of Cuito Cuanavale will go down as an historic tuming point in southem Africa and quite conceivably as Pretoria's Waterloo. The trouncing of the SADF in southem Angola forced Pretoria to the negotiating table and brought tremendous international pressure to bear for the implementation of UN Resolution 435, paving the way for the independence of Namibia.
Besides securing Namibia's independence, the victory at Cuito Cuanavale stymied Pretoria's campaign to secure southern Africa as its exclusive zone of control. By transforming the regional balance of power, South Africa's defeat hastened the end of apartheid. The achievement of Namibian independence was viewed as a full-blown defeat for Pretoria that would have "incalculable consequences ... both in the confidence it would ignite in the black community and in the setback for the morale of many whites" (Brittain, 1988b: 123) . As the acclaimed historian Basil Davidson noted, the cumulative weight of these defeats "beganto take effect" in South Africa; 'thevision of a liberated south came a little closer" (Davidson, 1991: 348) . At the March 1990 celebration of Namibia's independence, Nelson Mandela, just freed from 27 years of imprisonment declared: "South Africa would still have been in Angola if Cuba had not taken the bold decision of challenging South Africa.... We are indebted to the Cubans because the liberation of Namibia leaves only one country in this region which is not free and this is South Africa" (Bravo, 1990) . As Tambo (1991) The Cuban forces were to stay in Angola over a decade. That stay ended only when, after defeat at Cuito Cuanavale, the apartheid invaders understood that they would never be able to realise their objectives and that the Angolan people should have the freedom to determine their future. With that realisation camne the understanding in Pretoria that it could not dictate to the independent African states through the use of force. Neither could ithold back the tide leading to the independence of Namibia and the liberation of South Africa.
In an address at the University of Havana, Mbeki (200 During a 1991 visit to Cuba, Mandela (1993: 119, 121, 124) underlined the significance of the island's contribution:
The Cuban people hold a special place in the hearts of the people of Africa. The Cuban intemationalists have made a contribution to African independence, freedom, and justice unparalleled for its principled and selfless character. We in Africa are used to being victims of countries wanting to carve up our territory or subvert our sovereignty. It is unparalleled in African history to have another people rise to the defense of one of us. The defeat of the apartheid army was an inspiration to the struggling people in South Africa! Without the defeat of Cuito Cuanavale our organizations would not have been unbannedW The defeat of the racist army at Cuito Cuanavale has made it possible for me to be here today! Cuito Cuanavale was a milestone in the history of the struggle for southem African liberation! Cuito Cuanavale has been a tuming point in the struggle to free the continent and our country from the scourge of apartheid! The decisive defeat of Cuito Cuanavale altered the balance of forces within the region and substantially reduced the capacity of Pretoria to destabilise its neighbours. This, in combination with our people's struggle within the country, was crucial in bringing Pretoria to realise it would have to talk.
That Cuito Cuanavale was the watershed in the struggle against the apartheid regime is further attested to by the grim atmosphere that prevailed throughout southern Africa before the battle, particularly in the frontline states, the countries that bore the brunt of Pretoria's destabilization war. As Brittain (1988b: 119) notes, the years immediately preceding Cuito Cuanavale had been marked by a series of severe setbacks: unfettered aggression in Mozambique, culminating in President Samora Machel's assassination in 1986, unrelenting and seemingly unstoppable SADF attacks throughout the region, and intensified repression inside South Africa, nearly crippling many of the antiapartheid organizations (see Christie, 1989: xiii-xix; Davidson, 1991: 347-348; Saul, 1993: 10-12; vanDiepen, 1988: 127-132) . Duringthe 1986 state of emergency, the South African government had arrested or detained more than 40,000 persons and instituted a policy inwhich "violence was now lethal and systematic in its assault on the black majority" (Davidson 1991: 347; see also SAIRR, . The TRC (1999: 39) noted that"in the year after the imposition of the national state of emergency, the full force of a strategy of counter-revolutionary warfare unfolded domestically. By the end of 1987, the government succeeded in reasserting control and effectively defused whatever potential existed for an insurrectionary situation." The state of affairs seemed so bleak that many African leaders became resigned to accepting "the previously unthinkable possibility that 'the inevitable end of apartheid' was much further off than they publicly predicted" (Brittain, 1988b: 1 19) . Cuito Cuanavale changed everything. It represented not only a military and strategic turning point but a collective psychological catharsis. It was the crystallization of Pretoria's fear that "an agreement to pull-out of Angola and grant independence to Namibia would send a signal to radical black groups in South Africa, currently in a demoralized state, that white power is once more on the retreat" (Times [London] , July 15, 1988 Ellis, a Cuba specialist at the University of Toronto, has said, "Humanity owes Cuba an enormous debt. In the history of humankind there has been no country as generous as Cuba" (2004) . Dominic Tweedle, a resident of Johannesburg, exhorts us not to "forget that Cubans shed blood in Angola for the sake of the liberation of all Southern Africa" (2004) . Even the S outh African Broadcasting Corporation acknowledges that it was in southern Angola that "forces, mostly Cuban, turned the tide against the apartheid army" (SABC, 2004) .
Patrick Ricketts underscores that the defeat of the apartheid army led directly to the negotiations that "laid the basis for a political settlement in Namibia," established "security from apartheid aggression" in the region, and culminated in the collapse of apartheid (personal communication, December 22, 2004) . Angel Villa (2004) Cuba's example is a profound challenge to those who believe that foreign policy is determined solely by realpolitik, national self-interest, and the pursuit of power and wealth. Its intervention in Angola was aimed at defending and strengthening Angolan national sovereignty rather than subverting it at repelling a potential occupying and colonizing force rather than establishing a new colonial process. To state it more candidly: Cuba exemplifies the dis-tinction between those who fight for the cause ofnational liberation and independence and those who wage war to occupy, colonize, and plunder. NOTES 1. Patrick Ricketts, a participant in the battle, is a member of the Ex-Combatants Association in South Africa and the director of its special project PFrom Robben Island to C:uito Cuanavale " and frequently organizes and leads tours of former fighters to the former battleground (see SABC, 2004) . He notes that "hundreds of remains of SADF soldiers (skeletons in SADF as well as UTN1TA uniforms) are stil trapped in the banks of the C:uito River (personal communication. December 22, 2004) . Many of those who died were killed in the defensive minefields that were laid by the Angolans and Cubans. The Tumpo Triangle, a 10-square -kilometer area, was particularly lethal. Ricketts says, "I think the parents of those SADF soldiers whose remains are stil trapped in Cuito Cuanavale should have the right to know about it as well as the right to pay their last honourto theirchildren, as not allwhite South Africans wanted to be part ofthe apartheid war effort, but were focefully conscripted into it. Thus the SADF generals should come clean and explain this uncovered reality to South Africans as Mr. P. W. Botha himself tried to negotiate the retrieval of those remains with the Angolan authorities in 1988." 2. Another World War II Russian-front analogy has been used to characterize the battle of Cuito Cuanavale; it has been described as Africa's battle of Kursk (see, e.g., P. Ricketts, interview, January 8, 2005). The latter took place in July 1943 and was the largest tank battle in history. Itwas the last attemptby Hitler's regime to turn the tide on the Eastern Front and, thus, in the war as a whole. While the comparison with Kursk is apt, a better one, in my opinion, is Staingrad. Staingrad was "the most long drawn-out battle of the Second World War, and proved to be the mostcrucial battle " (Hart, 1968: 6; see also Alexander, 2000: 145-155; Axel, 2001: 169-173; Beevog 1998; 398-405; Fleming, 1961: 144-145; Jukes, 1968: 152-157; Raus, 2003: 185, 346-347; Werth, 1964: 441-598, Wieder and Graf Von Einsiedel, 1995: 131, 163-164, 171-178, 248, 278) . It transformed the fortunes of the military, placing the German armed forces "in grave peril" (Guderian, 1982: 275) . Reinhard Gehlen, a former German general and head of Foreign Armies East, the major Nazi intelligence and espionage operation against the Soviet Union during the war, states that Stalingrad "ma-rked the turning of the tide in the eastern campaign; it heralded the ultimate defeat of the Third Reich" (1972: 56). As John Erickson (2003: 43) , widely considered the preeminent historian of the Eastern Front, underscores, "In Germany, Stalingrad wrought immense psychological havoc as a harbinger of defeat." While the battle of Kursk destroyed the German capacity to wage large-scale offensive operations on the Eastern Front and was in a real sense the decisive military encounter, it was Stalingrad that was the strategic, political, and psychological watershed. Stalingrad had a tremendous moral impact within and outside Germany, particularly on the morale of the army, the civilian population, and Berlin's allies.
After the defeat at Stalingrad "the repercussions in domestic and foreign politics were not long delayed. It was obviously the turning point of the war" (Wieder and Graf Von Einsiedel, 1995: 164) .
